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Cross-border financial flows arise when (otherwise identical) countries differ in
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grated countries have access to the same set of financial instruments, and yet there
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1 Introduction
Recent decades have exhibited a proliferation of financial innovation and dramatic in-
creases in gross international financial flows among financially developed countries. Economists
have tended to focus on flows between developed and emerging economies, but gross flows
among developed economies are substantial.1 If these flows were primarily driven by di-
versification motives, then one would expect capital flows to dampen shocks and decrease
volatility. However, there is ample evidence that financial integration increases volatility
and amplifies shocks, suggesting that the nature of these flows are at least in part driven
by other motives. We show that cross-border differences in the ability to collateralize fi-
nancial promises are enough to generate international capital flows because international
financial trade is a way of sharing scarce collateral. Critically, these flows amplify global
volatility in asset prices and collapse during crises.
Motivating evidence
The following empirical observations motivate our analysis.
Observation 1: There are substantial gross financial flows between rich countries with
similar levels of financial development. These gross financial flows (countries simultane-
ously buying and selling foreign and domestic assets) are an order of magnitude larger
than net trade in assets. In some cases these offsetting flows are heavily concentrated in
financial assets and in particular in securitized mortgage securities. First, among devel-
oped countries there are substantial foreign holdings of government bonds, and for many
countries non-residents make up the largest investor base (Andritzky, 2012). Second, there
are substantial gross flows between the U.S. and Europe (see Shin, 2012; Bertaut et al.,
2012). These flows were most striking pre-crisis, and while they have partially reversed
post-crisis (as did all gross flows), the patterns remain.2 Finally, as documented by Hale
and Obstfeld (2016), there are substantial gross flows within Europe, and these flows are
concentrated in just a few countries: Germany, Belgium, and France stand out among the
1See for example Bruno and Shin (2014), who discuss implications for intermediation costs.
2See BIS locational banking statistics.
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core countries, and crucially Ireland behaves much like the core countries, intermediating
funds to the other peripheral countries as well as to the core.3
Observation 2: Financial integration tends to increase co-movement and volatility,
particularly in response to financial shocks, and particularly through banking flows and
securitized markets. Many empirical papers find that financial integration increases co-
movement across countries (see Imbs, 2006; Kose, Otrok and Whiteman, 2008; Davis,
2014). Furthermore, financial crises are particularly likely to propagate. Santis and Gerard
(1997) find that severe U.S. market declines are contagious internationally, with domestic
crashes propagating through (even diversified) international portfolios. Kalemli-Ozcan,
Papaioannou and Perri (2013) find that financial crises induce co-movements among fi-
nancially integrated countries. Loutskina and Strahan (2015) find that the housing boom
was exported via financial integration in securitized markets, thus raising the local effect of
collateral shocks and increasing volatility. Andritzky (2012) finds that government bond
yield volatility increases in the presence of non-resident investors. Additionally, Acharya
and Schnabl (2010) find that the geography of financial crises is determined by global
banks and securitized markets, not by “global imbalances” and net flows.
Overview of the model and results
These observations suggest a need for a theory that can explain both: not only capital
flows among similarly-developed, rich countries, but also capital flows correlated with
higher volatility. In this paper we propose that cross-country differences in the ability
to use assets as collateral can account for both observations. We consider a two-country
model with incomplete markets and collateralized financial markets. The two countries,
Home and Foreign, are identical in every way except for the sophistication with which
their financial systems can use collateral. The Home country has an advanced financial
system that enables investors to use a risky asset as collateral to issue state-contingent
financial promises. In contrast, in the Foreign country investors can use a risky asset (with
3From 2000–2007 core European banks increased their balance sheets, intermediating funds from the rest
of the world, to finance the net current accounts of the periphery countries—Greece, Italy, Ireland, Portugal,
and Spain (“GIIPS”). As a result, core banks borrowed from abroad to invest in GIIPS.
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identical payoffs as the Home asset) as collateral to issue non-contingent promises only
(collateralized debt). The different ability to collateralize financial promises gives rise to
different abilities to create risk-free and negative-beta financial securities (only Home can
tranche the asset into negative-beta securities). Our model provides precise predictions
regarding the direction of capital flows and their effects on volatility during crises.
We first conduct a static analysis to understand how financial innovation drives capital
flows. Crucially, after financial integration both Home and Foreign have access to the same
set of financial instruments. Flows arise even though there are no interest rate differentials
(or differences in precautionary savings), nor hedging or risk-sharing motives to trade
assets (agents are risk-neutral and assets have identical payoffs). And yet asset prices do
not converge. One would expect the price difference to disappear between two assets with
identical payoffs once integration is allowed, but instead we observe that the difference
increases. This difference is due to the gap in collateral values: the Home asset is better
collateral since it can be tranched into state-contingent promises whereas the Foreign asset
can only be used to issue debt. Moreover, Home runs a current account deficit financed by
the sale of its more-expensive assets.
We next consider a dynamic setting to study the effects of financial integration on the
volatility of asset prices and capital flows. We find that financial integration generally in-
creases price crashes and can lead to collapses in gross and net flows after bad news. Asset
prices in Foreign become much more volatile due to fluctuations in the attractiveness of
alternative investments (Home assets that can be tranched). Furthermore, Foreign demand
for collateral-backed financial promises (negative-beta securities) increases the collateral
value of Home assets, amplifying price fluctuations. Hence, asset prices in both coun-
tries become more volatile as a result of financial integration. Furthermore, net and gross
financial flows collapse following bad news.
Discussion
Our proposed mechanism, that financial flows arise as a way to share collateral, has several
attractive features and important implications. First, trades driven by global demands to
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share collateral lead to gross international flows even among countries that are otherwise
identical. We propose that differences in financial innovation between the U.S. and Europe
contributed to the expansion of European banks’ balance sheets.4 In particular, the abil-
ity of the U.S. financial system to leverage and tranche U.S. assets (especially mortgages)
created securities in demand by European banks.5 Our story provides an attractive hypoth-
esis to explain some of the differences between Ireland, Germany, and the rest of Europe.
Since the ability of a country to use assets as collateral is the feature that differentiates
countries that are otherwise similarly developed. Finally, if collateral-based financial in-
novations are an important driver of gross flows, then a logical conjecture is that the wave
of securitization beginning in the late 1990s could possibly explain the recent divergence
between gross and net global flows.
Second, our story has important implications for asset prices, global financial stability,
and crisis transmission. Financial integration tends to increase asset prices, export volatil-
ity across borders, and lead to collapses in flows.6 While Shin (2012) emphasizes how
expanded intermediation by European banks depresses credit spreads in the U.S., we doc-
ument how global banking flows and financial linkages of the type seen between the U.S.
and Europe can create serious spillovers, exporting U.S. volatility to European markets
and greatly increasing the fragility of the global financial system.
Our mechanism relies on the fact that there are meaningful cross-country differences
in the use of collateral. Indeed, there is indirect suggestive evidence that this is the case.
Data on the loan terms for U.S. securities used as collateral in domestic funding markets
are only beginning to be collected and used in limited samples (see Copeland, Martin and
Walker (2014) and Baklanova et al. (2017) for evidence). In the absence of direct evidence
to justify our conjecture, one could instead consider proxies for cross-country differences
in demand for and supply of collateral. In countries with limited abilities to use assets
4European banks may also have an advantage at intermediation (one explanation for the pre-crisis ex-
pansion), but our results imply that gross flows would arise even if they do not.
5Shin argues that the regulatory environment in Europe and the advent of the Euro enabled banks to
easily expand their balance sheets. We argue that the question remains: why did European banks expand by
intermediating U.S. assets and liabilities as much as they did?
6Bekaert and Harvey (2000) provide empirical evidence that financial integration increases domestic
asset prices.
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as collateral, we would expect to see two patterns. First, domestic investors that employ
leverage should be more likely to invest in the limited set of assets that serve as collateral,
which typically means government bonds. Second, domestic investors should be more
inclined to purchase from abroad financial assets that can serve as collateral. In contrast,
countries that have greater abilities to use assets as collateral should disproportionately
supply such assets to the rest of the world. Indeed, the following evidence suggests that
there may be underlying differences in how countries treat assets as collateral in funding
markets.
Several demand proxies suggest countries have differential needs for collateral. First,
there is substantial variation in the degree to which financial institutions (leveraged in-
vestors) invest in domestic government debt. Specifically, financial institutions in deep
financial centers hold much smaller portfolios of government bonds compared to finan-
cial institutions in countries with less-deep financial centers (Andritzky, 2012). Second,
there is heterogeneous foreign demand for U.S. long-term debt (Treasury bonds, corpo-
rate bonds, and asset-backed securities (ABS)). Developed countries, and especially those
with deep financial centers, hold large portfolios of U.S. corporate debt, but less devel-
oped G20 countries primarily hold Treasuries, and Asian countries hold comparably much
higher portfolios of ABS.7 Importantly, there is variation even among rich countries. As
an example, the portfolio holdings of Japan look much more like the holdings of China
than the holdings of the U.K. Compared to the U.K., Japan holds lots of Treasuries and
ABS.8
These patterns could reflect cross-country differences in the supply of collateral. In
countries that produce less collateral, government bonds (typically good collateral) are
7According to the U.S. Department of the Treasury TIC data, as of June 2016 roughly 50% of the U.S.
long-term portfolio holdings of countries in Europe, Canada, and Australia were in corporate non-ABS,
while the portfolios of Africa, Asia, and Latin America were less than 10% corporate non-ABS. Similarly,
Europe, Canada, and Australia hold fewer than 40% of U.S. long-term securities in Treasuries, whereas the
holdings for Africa, Asia, and Latin America were 75–87 percent.
8Japan has 74% in Treasuries, 13% in Agency ABS, and 12% in corporate non-ABS. The UK has 31% in
Treasuries and 65% in corporate non-ABS. China looks more like Japan, with 15% in Agency ABS and the
rest in Treasuries. Finally, South Korea holds 50% Treasuries, 23% Agency ABS, 11% Agency non-ABS,
and 16% corporate non-ABS.
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more valuable for leveraged buyers.9 Similarly, countries that do not produce collateral
have greater demand for U.S. Treasuries and ABS, which can be used as collateral either
directly in funding markets (Treasuries) or indirectly in how they are sold as tranches.10
11
Supply proxies also suggest that countries have different ability to produce collat-
eral. First, global flows are increasingly characterized by demand for “safe assets” and
“negative-beta assets,” many of which are created through financial innovations in secu-
ritized markets. Safe assets originate from the U.S., and to a lesser extent from Europe.
According to the External Wealth of Nations dataset from Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2007),
in 2011 the U.S. net supply of safe assets accounted for roughly two-thirds of the global
net supply of safe assets, and the Eurozone accounted for another fifth.12 Furthermore,
from 1980–1990, the global net supply of safe assets was between 2 and 3% of world
GDP, and has risen to 14% in 2011. The U.S. share was 5% in 2000 and rose to 9% in
2011. Many have noted that the increase in safe asset supply has been driven primar-
ily by financial innovations in how the U.S. securitizes assets. Securitization also creates
negative-beta assets because some safe assets tend to increase in value in bad states of the
world.13 Accordingly, these flows are suggestive evidence of differential abilities to use
9As evidence of this argument, Wang (2016) documents substantial heterogeneous portfolio adjustments
among U.S. following quantitative easing (QE). After QE, financial institutions held more foreign long-term
bonds, while non-financial organizations reduced holdings of foreign long-term bonds. These patterns are
exactly what one would expect when the supply of collateral shrinks (as a result of QE), given heterogeneous
demand for leverage and variations in the ability of assets to serve as collateral.
10Senior-subordinated tranches implicitly provide investors the ability to use the underlying bonds as
collateral. See Gong and Phelan (2016b) for more detail.
11As additional supporting evidence, Maggiori, Neiman and Schreger (2017) show that foreign mutual
funds demonstrate a “home currency bias,” holding low levels of corporate bonds denominated in foreign
currency—except when the currency is the dollar. In that case, foreign and U.S. investors hold nearly
identical bond portfolios. One potential explanation for this currency preference could be that dollar assets
are more readily accepted as collateral in funding markets.
12The U.S. net supply of safe assets accounted for 9% of world GDP, and the Eurozone accounted for 3%:
total global net supply was roughly 14% of world GDP.
13For example, long-maturity bonds increase in price in bad states because long-term interest rates de-
cline, even as the face value of the promised payoffs remain the same. Trade in these securities have im-
portant consequences for gross flows. Shin (2012) documents how European banks greatly expanded their
balance sheets by increasing both U.S. assets and liabilities (European banks borrowed from U.S. markets
and purchased U.S. assets). Similarly, Bertaut et al. (2012) show that during the 2000s European investors
purchased U.S. asset-backed securities and similar securities. Additionally, Bertaut et al. (2012) provide
consistent evidence of differential abilities to supply securitized assets.
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assets as collateral.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the related literature.
Section 3 presents the basic general equilibrium model with collateral. Section 4 studies
the effects of financial integration in a static model. Section 5 uses a three-period model
to study the consequences of financial integration on price and flows volatility. Section 6
concludes. All supplemental material is presented in the Appendix.
2 Related Literature
Our paper follows the model of collateral equilibrium developed in Geanakoplos (1997,
2003), Fostel and Geanakoplos (2008, 2012a,b, 2015, 2016), Geanakoplos and Zame
(2014), Phelan (2015), and Gong and Phelan (2016a,b). Our paper adds to this work
by studying the effect of collateral and financial innovation on global flows and interna-
tional asset prices. In particular we work with a class of models, “C-models,” introduced
by Geanakoplos (2003).
Our paper is related to a large literature on how differences in financial systems drive
capital flows. This “global imbalances” literature has tended to focus on how net capi-
tal flows arise between developed and developing countries. The literature has broadly
considered differences in (i) state-completeness, (ii) the ability to supply financial assets,
(iii) sharing idiosyncratic risk, and (iv) funding costs. In this literature, financial flows
are driven primarily by interest rate (or investment return) differentials that manifest in
different savings across countries. Financial integration leads to a convergence in savings
levels and interest rates, and current account deficits can be financed indefinitely because
the financially “deep” country earns intermediation rents.
Willen (2004) shows that market incompleteness across countries causes trade imbal-
ances because superior risk-sharing in one country leads to a lower precautionary demand
for saving. Caballero, Farhi and Gourinchas (2008) emphasize the role of heterogeneous
domestic financial systems in explaining global imbalances in which financial imperfec-
tions are captured by a country’s ability to supply assets in a deterministic model. Their
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paper assumes that “Home” can supply more financial assets from real assets, which af-
fects autarkic savings and interest rates, and the model can explain capital flows, current
account deficits, and low interest rates.
Mendoza, Quadrini and Rios-Rull (2009) and Angeletos and Panousi (2011) have em-
phasized how net capital flows arise when the developed country can better insure idiosyn-
cratic risk. Poor risk sharing increases buffer-stock savings and decreases autarkic interest
rates. Within this literature, Phelan and Toda (2018) study how the risk-sharing qualities
of securitized markets affect international capital flows, growth, and welfare, showing that
capital flows from the high- to low-margin country. Maggiori (2017) provides a model in
which Home financiers can take on greater financial risk as a result of funding advantages.
This leads Home to run persistent current account deficits financed by the risk-premium
earned by its financial sector, which can better absorb aggregate shocks.
While these interest rate and risk-sharing mechanisms are clearly important for un-
derstanding global flows and imbalances, we emphasize instead the role of collateral to
facilitate gross flows, especially among developed countries. In our model, agents are
risk-neutral, assets are identical, and interest rates do not change with financial integration
(they are always zero). Flows are not driven by different savings demand. In our model
all agents have identical savings demand, but agents have different portfolio demands. In-
stead, leverage and tranching create contingent securities from underlying collateral, and
international trade allows investors to buy securities that are not available domestically.
In our model, flows emerge because agents trade in underlying assets and not simply in
a risk-free bond. Furthermore, our earlier observations suggest that focusing on net flows
alone is insufficient, as the differentiation between gross inflows and outflows has become
more important (Forbes and Warnock, 2012). While, in the early and mid 1990s net and
gross flows used to move together, more recently the size and volatility of gross flows have
increased while net capital flows have been more stable.
Finally, our focus on how financial integration leads to propagation and comovement is
related to several theoretical papers. Caballero and Simsek (2016), who consider a model
in which gross flows are driven by demands for liquidity (diversification) and the “fickle”
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reversal of capital flows creates instability. Flow reversals are assumed and the focus of
the paper is on the implications for policy ex ante taking fickle flows as given. Men-
doza and Quadrini (2010) extend the model in Mendoza, Quadrini and Rios-Rull (2009)
(flows between U.S. and RoW driven by precautionary savings) to include financial in-
termediaries and study how financial integration affects the consequences of a one-time
non-anticipated shock to intermediary capital. They find that shocks propagate as a re-
sult of financial integration; importantly, however, asset price declines are smaller than
would be in autarky and the crisis would have been worse for the U.S. if it had not been
financially integrated. In contrast, in our model price crashes are larger with financial
integration, not in autarky. Theoretical work by Devereux and Yetman (2010) and Ueda
(2012) present models, with financial intermediaries or with leverage constraints, in which
financial integration affects spillovers, propagation through interdependent portfolios, and
business-cycle synchronization.
3 General Equilibrium Model with Collateral
In this section we present a one-country C-model. We later use this architecture in an
international two-country setting in Sections 4 and 5.
Time, Commodities and Assets
The model is a two-period general equilibrium model, with time t = 0,1. Uncertainty is
represented by a tree S = {0,U,D} with a root s = 0 at time 0 and two terminal states of
nature ST = {U,D} at time 1.
Let L0 = {c0,Y}, LU = {cU}, LD = {cD} be the set of commodities in states 0,U and
D. Denote by LT =∪s∈ST Ls the set of commodities in terminal states. Let Fs(c0,Y ) = c0+
dsY, s ∈ ST be an inter-period production function connecting any vector of commodities
at state s = 0 with the vector of commodities it becomes in each state s ∈ ST . As shown in
Figure 1, c0 is a (perfectly) durable consumption good and Y is physical risky asset, which








Figure 1: Time, commodities and assets.
state D.
We can always normalize one price in each state, so we take the price of cs in state
s ∈ S to be one. The price of the asset Y at time 0 is denoted by p.
Agents
Agents are uniformly distributed in the continuum I = [0,1] described by the Lebesgue
measure. Each investor i∈ [0,1] is risk-neutral, does not discount the future, and consumes
only at time 1. The von-Neumann-Morgenstern expected utility to agent i is
U i(c0,Y,cU ,cD) = γ iU cU + γ
i
DcD, (1)
where (γ iU ,γ
i
D) = (γ(i),1− γ(i)) are the subjective probabilities. We suppose that γ(i) is
strictly increasing and continuous in i. Since only the output of Y depends on the state
and 0 < dD < dU , higher i denotes more optimism. Heterogeneity among the agents stems
entirely from the dependence of γ(i) on i.
Each investor i ∈ (0,1) has initial endowments of commodities at time 0 only, i.e.
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e = (ec0,eY ,ecU ,ecD) = (ec0 ,eY ,0,0).
Financial Contracts and Collateral
The heart of our analysis involves financial contracts and collateral. We explicitly incor-
porate repayment enforceability problems.14 Agents cannot be coerced into honoring their
promises except by seizing collateral agreed upon by contract in advance.
A financial contract j = (( jU , jD),1Y ) consists of a promise ( jU , jD) of repayment in
units of the consumption good at each future state, collateralized by one unit of Y .15 We
denote the total set of contracts by J.
The lender has the right to seize as much of the collateral as will make him whole once
the promise comes due, but no more. Hence, the delivery of the contract is given by
(min( jU ,dU),min( jD,dD)). (2)
Each contract j ∈ J trades at price π j. We denote the sale of promise j by ϕ j < 0 and the
purchase of the same contract by ϕ j > 0. The sale of a financial contract corresponds to
borrowing the sale price, π j, and the purchase is tantamount to lending the same price in
return for the promise. Whereas the sale of ϕ j < 0 contracts requires the ownership of ϕ j
units of Y , the purchase of the same number of contracts does not require any ownership
of Y.
Budget Set
Given asset and contract prices at time 0, (p,(π j) j∈J), each agent i ∈ I chooses asset
holdings y of Y , contract trades ϕ j and consumption c0 in state 0, and consumption in final
states cU ,cD, in order to maximize utility (1) subject to the budget set defined by
14We exclude collateral management problems. The value of the collateral in each future state does not
depend on the size of the promise, or on what other choices the seller makes, or on who owns the asset at
the very end. This eliminates any issues associated with hidden effort or unobservability. See Fostel and
Geanakoplos (2016, 2015) for a discussion
15Restricting contracts to be collateralized by one unit of Y is without loss of generality. A contract
promising (0.4,0.4) backed by two units of Y is identical to two units of a contract promising (0.2,0.2)




(c0,y,ϕ,cU ,cD) ∈ RL0+ ×RJ×R
LT
+ :
c0 + py+ ∑
j∈J




cs = Fs(c0,Y )+ ∑
j∈J
ϕ j min( js,ds),s ∈ ST
}
.
At time 0, total expenditures on the consumption good, the asset and financial con-
tracts has to be financed by the value of initial endowments. The second constraint is the
collateral constraint, which states that the total short position on financial contracts cannot
exceed the total asset holdings required as collateral. Finally, consumption in the terminal
states is derived from the receipts of storage, asset dividends and financial contracts net
deliveries.
Collateral Equilibrium
A Collateral Equilibrium in this economy is a price of asset Y, contract prices, asset hold-




























(c0,y,ϕ,cU ,cD) ∈ Bi(p,π)⇒U i(c0,y,ϕ,cU ,cD)≤U i(ci0,yi,ϕ i,ciU ,ciD),∀i
In equilibrium, all markets clear and agents optimize their utilities in their budget
sets. Geanakoplos and Zame (2014) show that, given our assumptions, equilibrium in
this model always exists.
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4 A Static Model of Global Flows
We now consider a C-model with two countries, Home and Foreign (denoted by ∗), each
defined as in Section 3. Both countries are identical in every way except for the feasible
financial contracts available in each country, J and J∗.
The key—and only—difference between the two countries is that Home has a more
advanced financial system than Foreign. In our baseline model, we assume that Foreign
assets can be used as collateral to issue non-contingent financial promises (i.e., collater-
alized debt). In other words, Foreign assets can be leveraged. In contrast, we consider a
more sophisticated use of Y as collateral by the Home financial sector: Home assets can
be used as collateral to issue state-contingent financial promises. In other words, the risky
Home asset can be tranched into state-contingent promises.16 This feature intends to cap-
ture the advanced ability of the U.S. financial system to securitize and tranche mortgages
and other financial assets.
Financial systems differ in a myriad of both subtle and complex ways (for example,
the level of insurance and risk sharing) but the salient features that we are focusing on
are the ability to leverage, securitize, and tranche assets, which is reflected in the financial
structures we assume. We model investors as directly borrowing against assets, but these
trades could also capture the role of financial intermediaries in producing the financial
assets that correspond to these cash flows. We return to this distinction in Section 4.3.
The main insight from the static analysis is that differences in the ability to collateral-
ize financial promises across borders are enough to generate gross international financial
flows. In our model, financially integrated countries have access to the same set of fi-
nancial instruments: there are no interest rate differentials (e.g., arising from differences
in precautionary savings), nor hedging or risk-sharing motives to trade assets (agents are
risk-neutral and assets have identical payoffs). International trade in financial assets is
16In Appendix D we also consider when Foreign assets cannot be used as collateral at all, and when
Home can either leverage or tranche assets. This model with no leverage in Foreign presents many similar
intuitions, mechanisms, and insights that are present in the richer model with leverage and tranching. The
model when Home can leverage provides insights corresponding to trade between developed and developing
countries.
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a way to internationally share scarce collateral. Furthermore, the autarkic cross-country
price differential of assets with identical payoffs not only persists but gets larger after fi-
nancial integration. Finally, Home always run a current account deficit financed by trade
in more expensive financial assets.
We first describe autarkic equilibria in each country and then describe the equilibrium
with financial integration. As a way of developing intuition before presenting the theoreti-
cal results, we numerically solve for the equilibrium in each case for the following param-
eters: agents’ utilities and endowments in both countries are given by γ(i) = 1− (1− i)2,
eY = ec0 = 1, and asset payoffs in both countries are given by dU = 1 and dD = 0.2.
4.1 Foreign Autarky: Leverage
In autarky, the Foreign financial sector can issue non-contingent promises using the asset
as collateral. In this case J∗ = { j : j = (( j, j),1Y )}. Each debt contract promises j at
t = 1, and is collateralized by one unit of the asset. When selling contract j an investor
borrows π j at t = 0. Hence, by purchasing Y ∗ and selling any contract j, Foreign agents
can leverage their purchases of assets.
Leverage is endogenous in the model: agents choose which contracts to trade, taking
their prices as given. All contracts are priced in equilibrium, however, since collateral is
scarce, only a few of them (or even just one) may be actively traded. Fostel and Geanako-
plos (2012b) show that in C-models the only contract actively traded is the “maxmin”
contract j∗ = mins=U,D{ds} = dD, with an associated price π∗ = dD (so the risk-free in-
terest rate is zero), ruling out default in equilibrium. Notice that when agents leverage
asset Y ∗ by selling the maxmin contract j∗ = dD, they are effectively buying the Arrow
U∗ security, since, per unit of asset they leverage with the maxmin contract, they consume
dU −dD in the state U and dD−dD = 0 in state D.
With this result in hand, equilibrium in this economy is easy to characterize. In equi-
librium there is a marginal buyer i∗1, who is indifferent between leveraging Y
∗ and holding
the consumption good c∗.17 All agents i > i∗1 buy all the Y
∗ in the economy with leverage:







buy the riskless bond j*=dD and
consumption good, c*.
Figure 2: Equilibrium regime in Foreign autarky.
they borrow dD by selling debt contract j∗ = dD using Y ∗ as collateral (effectively buying
the Arrow U∗ security). Agents i < i∗1 lend to the more optimistic investors, holding the
durable consumption good and the risk-free debt j∗ = dD. This regime can be seen in
Figure 2. Equilibrium is described by a system of two equations in two unknowns, p∗ and
i∗1:
eY ∗ = (1− i∗1)




p∗ = γ(i∗1)dU +(1− γ(i∗1))dD. (4)
Equation (3) corresponds to the market clearing condition for the Y ∗ market.18 The top
1− i∗1 agents are leveraging the asset. Each of the agents is spending the total value of
their initial endowment of ec0 + eY ∗ p
∗ on the downpayment, p∗− dD. Their aggregate
demand has to equal the aggregate supply of eY ∗ . Paying only the downpayment p∗−dD,
as opposed to the full price, allows a relatively small fraction of agents to buy all the asset
in the economy—certainly fewer than would be required if no borrowing were allowed.19
agents I.
18The risk-free market (consumption good and the riskless bond) clears by Walras’ Law.
19See Appendix D for an analysis of this case.
16
Equation (4) states that the asset is priced according to the marginal buyer’s beliefs.20
Notice that equation (4) can also be written as 1 = γ(i
∗
1)(dU−dD)
p∗−dD , where the right-hand side
is the return of the leveraged position (or the return of a Arrow U∗). For the parameters
above, equilibrium is given by i∗1 = 0.63 and p
∗ = 0.89.
4.2 Home Autarky: Tranching
We suppose that J consists of the single contingent promise jT = ((0,dD),1Y ), a “down-
tranche.” Notice that when buying Y and using it as collateral to issue the down-tranche, an
agent completely tranches the asset payoffs into Arrow securities. The seller, is effectively
buying an Arrow U security that pays (dU ,0), and the buyer of the tranche is effectively
buying an Arrow D security that pays (0,dD).21
The equilibrium at Home is also simple to characterize. It features two marginal buy-
ers, i2 < i1. Optimistic agents i > i1 buy all the Y in the economy and use it as collateral
to sell the down tranche jT = (0,dD), effectively holding an Arrow U security. Moderate
agents i ∈ [i2, i1] hold the consumption good. Finally, the most pessimistic agents i < i2
buy the down tranche jT = (0,dD) from the most optimistic investors, effectively buying
an Arrow D security. The equilibrium regime is presented in Figure 3.
In this case, equilibrium is described by a system of four equations and four unknowns:
the price of the asset, p, the price of the down tranche, πT , and the two marginal buyers,
i1 and i2. Equations (5) and (6) are the market clearing conditions for the asset Y and the
tranche jT :
eY = (1− i1)




(ec0 + eY p)
πT
. (6)
The top 1− i1 agents buy the asset and sell off the down tranche: they each have wealth
20The marginal buyer is indifferent between the leveraged position and holding a riskless position. Hence
the ratio of prices must equal the ratio or marginal utilities. Both, the price of the consumption good and its
marginal utility are one, yielding equation (4).







buy Y and sell Arrow D tranche jT
(holding Arrow U) 
buy the Arrow D tranche jT.
hold consumption good c.
Figure 3: Equilibrium regime in Home autarky.
ec0 +eY p that they spend solely on the downpayment p−πT ; their aggregate demand must
equal the aggregate supply of eY . Analogously, the aggregate demand for tranches from
the bottom i2 agents has to equal the aggregate supply of down tranche of eY . Equations







Equation (7) states that the marginal buyer i1 is indifferent between the return from tranch-
ing the asset (buying the asset and selling the down tranche) and the return from holding
the consumption good. Equation (8) states that the marginal buyer i2 is indifferent be-
tween the return from the down tranche and the return from holding the consumption
good. Equations (7) and (8) imply that the two marginal buyers determine the price of the
Arrow securities independently: i1 sets the price of the Arrow U and i2 the price of the
18
Arrow D.22
For the same parameter values, in equilibrium p = 1, πT = 0.17, i1 = 0.58 and i2 =
0.08. The asset price of the risky asset at Home is much higher than in the Foreign country.
This is a general property of C-models when beliefs are concave, as in our numerical
example (see Fostel-Geanakoplos (2012)). Note also that the price of the asset is higher
than any agent i< 1 believes can be justified by the fundamentals (if dD > 0.2 then the price
p would exceed 1, implying no agent believes fundamentals justify the price). Tranching
generates bubbles; we will return to this point in the next section.
4.3 Financial Integration
With financial integration (FI), Home and Foreign agents have access to the same set of
financial instruments. We denote equilibrium variables after financial integration by a
‘hat’(ˆ) to distinguish them from their autarkic counterparts.
In the FI equilibrium the marginal investors across countries are the same because the
assets have identical payoffs and agents have the same endowments and preferences. In
each country there are two common marginal investors: î1 > î2. Optimistic agents in both
countries i≥ î1 tranche Y and leverage Y ∗, effectively holding the Arrow U and Arrow U∗
securities. Moderate investors î2 < i < î1 hold consumption goods c and c∗, and riskless
bonds j∗ = dD. Finally, pessimistic investors i ≤ î2 buy the down tranche from the most
optimistic agents (hence holding an Arrow D). This regime is shown in Figure 4.
Equilibrium is described by a system of five equations in five unknowns: the prices of
the assets, p̂∗ and p̂, the price of the tranche, π̂T , and the marginal buyers, î1 and î2. The
first two equations are the market clearing conditions. Equation (9) is the market clearing
condition for Y and Y ∗ :
(1− î1)
(2ec0 + eY (p̂+ p̂
∗))
p̂+ p̂∗− (π̂T +dD)
= eY . (9)
22Despite the fact that both Arrow securities can be created through tranching the asset, markets are not
complete because Arrow securities are created through the asset only, and collateral equilibrium fails to






Optimists: Tranche Y and leverage Y*
(buy Arrow U and U*).
Pessimists: buy the Arrow D tranche jT.
Moderates: hold riskless bond j*=dD and
consumption goods c and c*.
Figure 4: Equilibrium regime in financial integration.
Equation (10) corresponds to market clearing for the down tranche:
î2
(2ec0 + eY (p̂+ p̂
∗))
π̂T
= eY . (10)
Compared to their autarky counterparts (equations (3), (5) and (6)), the market clearing
conditions in FI include wealth from both countries (2ec0 + eY (p̂+ p̂
∗)).23
The last three equations are no-arbitrage and optimality conditions. Equation (11)
states that by no-arbitrage, the return from tranching Y (that creates an Arrow U) and







23For example in the case of the down tranche market, investors will buy 1
π̂T
units of the tranche for
every unit of wealth. Home investors have wealth 1+ p̂ and Foreign investors have wealth 1+ p̂∗. Since all
investors i≤ î2 in each country buy the down tranche, the total global demand for down tranches is given by∫ î2
0
(


















Notice that we are assuming that countries are identical in everything except the set J, and we are hence
using the fact that endowments are the same in the above equation.
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Equation (12) states that the marginal buyer î1 is indifferent between an Arrow U (through
either tranching the Home asset or leveraging the Foreign asset) and a safe position (either




Equation (13) states that the marginal buyer î2 is indifferent between the down tranche and




4.3.1 Financial Integration and Asset Prices
One would expect the price difference between two assets with identical payoffs to dis-
appear once integration is allowed, but instead we observe that the difference increases.
Table 1 shows the equilibrium prices and marginal buyers.
Table 1: Equilibrium with financial integration.







First, financial integration increases the price of the Home asset Y , it goes from 1 to
1.029. Notice that from equations (12) and (13) we have that
p̂ = γ(î1)dU +(1− γ(î2))dD. (14)
With financial integration pessimistic Foreign investors demand down tranches (contingent
promises that were previously unavailable). Hence their price increases from 0.168 to
0.182, and the marginal buyer that prices the tranche, i2, decreases (going from 0.084 in
21
autarky to 0.047 in FI). Moreover, because buyers of Y can now issue a more expensive
tranche, fewer optimists are required to buy up all of Y , and so the marginal buyer, i1,
increases, rising from 0.58 in autarky to 0.61 in FI. Both of these effects cause the price of
Y to increase given equation (14).
Second, financial integration decreases the price of Y ∗, which goes from 0.893 to 0.878
(notice that the marginal buyer, i1, has decreased from 0.63 in autarky to 0.61 in FI). This is
because the attractiveness of alternative investments increases. With financial integration,
investors in the Foreign asset compare investing in the asset to a tranched return in the
Home asset, as shown by equation (11), rather than simply a safe position, as was the case
in autarky.
The effect of financial innovation on asset prices just described in our numerical ex-
ample is a general property stated in the following proposition.
Proposition 1:
Consider a C-model with two countries Home and Foreign as in Section 3. Then
p̂∗ < p∗ and p̂ > p: financial integration increases the Home asset price and decreases the
Foreign asset price.
Proof: see Appendix A.
Trade occurs, despite the identical assets’ payoffs in both economies, because as-
sets have different collateral capacities. The Home asset Y is better collateral: Y can
be tranched into state-contingent promises whereas Y ∗ can only be used to issue debt. One
would expect the price difference to disappear between two assets with identical payoffs
once integration is allowed, but instead we observe that the difference increases as we
showed in Proposition 1. This represents a deviation from the Law of One Price due to
the presence of different collateral values in equilibrium. This can be easily seen in our
numerical example. Consider the optimistic agent i = 0.9. Her marginal utility of money









Hence, tranching Y provides 1.17 utiles per dollar of down payment.
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Consider first the Home asset. Y has a collateral value beyond its payoff value. We
can measure these in dollar equivalents as follows. The Payoff Value of Y for agent
i = 0.9 is given by the marginal utility of Y measured in dollar equivalents, or PV 0.9Y =
0.99(1)+0.01(0.2)
µ0.9
= 0.85 < p̂. The Collateral Value of Y for agent i = 0.9 is given by the dif-
ference between the price and the payoff value, CV 0.9Y = p̂−PV 0.9Y = 1.029−0.85 = 0.18.
Consider next the Foreign asset Y ∗, which also has a collateral value, but lower. Since




0.85 < p̂∗. The Collateral Value of Y ∗ for agent i = 0.9 is given by CV 0.9Y ∗ = p̂
∗−PV 0.9Y ∗ =
0.87−0.85 = 0.03. With a continuum of investors, the economy features a continuum of
investor-specific collateral values, but the collateral value will always be positive for every
agent i > î1 = 0.61.24
Let us define the price gap between the Home and Foreign asset prices in equilibrium
as ∆̂ = p̂− p̂∗. Since both assets have identical payoffs and hence payoffs values, this
exactly represents the equilibrium gap in collateral values.25 The following proposition
provides a useful characterization of ∆̂ and shows that it is always positive.
Proposition 2:
Consider a C-model with two countries Home and Foreign as in Section 3. Then
∆̂ = dD(γ(î1)− γ(î2))> 0: the Home asset price always exceeds the Foreign asset price.
Proof:
From equations (11), (12), and (13), we can write asset prices as





p̂∗ = γ(î1)(dU −dD)+dD.
Hence we have ∆ = dD(γ(î1)−γ(î2)), which is positive since î1 > î2 and beliefs are mono-
tonic.
In what follows, we show that this positive collateral gap has important implications
for net and gross flows.
24See Fostel-Geanakoplos (2008).
25Although the collateral value is investor specific, the gap in collateral values is not.
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4.3.2 Financial Integration, Gross Flows and the Current Account
Determining the portfolio holdings and flows in the FI equilibrium requires some care,
since there are many securities that are perfect substitutes: the Arrow U and Arrow U∗
(created by tranching Y or leveraging Y ∗ respectively), consumption goods c,c∗ and the
riskless bond j = dD. We are going to use the fact that the regimes are the same in both
countries, and pin down the holdings by assuming that each country holds the same pro-
portion of everything.26
Holdings and flows are nominal. More specifically, for any security x, with price px
and supply Sx, the value of Home holdings and Foreign holdings are given by:




(ec0 + eY p̂)
2ec0 + eY (p̂+ p̂∗)
, δ ∗ =
(ec0∗ + eY ∗ p̂
∗)
2ec0 + eY (p̂+ p̂∗)
,
represent the weight, given by the ratio between domestic and international wealth.
The first way to describe international flows, shown in Figure 5, is in the space of
original commodities: collateral Y and Y ∗ and consumptions goods c and c∗.
Optimistic Foreign agents buy V ∗Y = 0.49 worth of Home assets and optimistic Home
agents buy VY ∗ = 0.46 worth of Foreign assets. The real counterpart of these financial flows
are that Foreign moderate agents buy V ∗c = 0.48 worth of the Home consumption good,
whereas Home moderate investors buy Vc∗ = 0.51 worth of the Foreign consumption good.
As a result V ∗Y −VY ∗ =Vc∗−V ∗c = 0.03.27 Home runs a current account deficit financed by
the difference in value of gross flows in assets serving as collateral.
In this first interpretation, countries trade in assets and use them as collateral to issue
26This is a very standard criteria, these holdings would arise in CAPM for example. Additionally, these
holdings would arise if Foreign assets were subject to even the smallest borrowing friction (e.g., constraint
on promises below dD). We could have chosen other criteria taking into account home bias, etc. Since this
is not a quantitative exercise, the precise way of doing it is not so relevant. Qualitative results, in terms of
direction of predicted flows, are unchanged.










Foreign buy V*Y= .49 
Home buy VY*= .46 
Foreign buy V*c= .48 
Home buy Vc*= .51 
Figure 5: International flows. First interpretation.
financial promises domestically. Home buys the foreign asset and leverages it by issuing
riskless bonds domestically, and Foreign buys the home asset and tranches it by selling
down tranches domestically.
A second way to describe international flows is in the space of derivatives created by
collateralized contracts. This second interpretation emphasizes that the source of different
collateral capacities across assets resides in domestic institutions: only financial insti-
tutions at Home can tranche the risky asset. This may be due to a more advanced court
system, etc. In this second view, there is a financial intermediary, that makes zero profits in
equilibrium, tranching the asset at Home (and leveraging the asset in the Foreign country).
Hence, we can think of international trade in derivatives and consumption goods directly.
As shown in Figure 6, optimistic Foreign agents buy V ∗U = 0.41 of Arrow U securities
whereas pessimistic Foreign agents buy V ∗D = 0.09 Down tranches, both created using the
Y asset as collateral. Optimistic Home agents buy VU∗ = 0.35 of Arrow U∗ tranches and
moderate Home agents buy VB∗ = 0.10 of the riskess bond, both created through leverag-
ing the Y ∗ asset. As before, net trade in goods (current account) equals the difference in
value of gross financial flows, so V ∗U +V
∗










Foreign buy V*U= .41 
Home buy VU*= .35
Foreign buy V*c= .48 
Home buy Vc*= .51 
Home buy VB*= .10
Foreign buy V*D= .09 
Figure 6: International flows. Second interpretation.
Note that, while the down tranche is a state-contingent security (and therefore very
risky), the creation of down tranches could also be interpreted as the creation of “safe
assets,” which as it turns out tend to increase in value in bad states of the world: negative-
beta assets are truly safe assets.28
The fact that Home runs a current account deficit financed by the sale of expensive
derivatives created through collateral is a general property of our model, as the following
proposition states.
Proposition 3:
Consider a C-model with two countries Home and Foreign as in Section 3. Then Home
always runs a current account deficit that is proportional to the collateral gap. That is,
CA =Vc∗−V ∗c =
eY ∆̂
2ec0 + eY (p̂+ p̂∗)
.
28First, long-maturity bonds increase in price in bad states because long-term interest rates decline (even
as the face value of the promised payoffs remain the same). Second, because the U.S. Dollar tends to
appreciate during crises, dollar-denominated bonds provide a natural hedge for foreign buyers. This is a
point made in Maggiori (2017), which, in a different financial context, describes the rest of the world buying
“down state” Arrow securities from Home in order to achieve safer portfolios.
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Proof:
Let Vc∗ and V ∗c denote the value of Home purchases of c
∗ and Foreign purchases of c :
Vc∗ =
(ec0 + eY p̂)
2ec0 + eY (p̂+ p̂∗)
, V ∗c =
(ec0∗ + eY ∗ p̂
∗)
2ec0 + eY (p̂+ p̂∗)
.
Hence we have that:
Vc∗−V ∗c =
(ec0 + eY p̂)
2ec0 + eY (p̂+ p̂∗)
−
(ec0∗ + eY ∗ p̂
∗)
2ec0 + eY (p̂+ p̂∗)
=
eY ∆̂
2ec0 + eY (p̂+ p̂∗)
.
By Proposition 2, Home always runs a current account deficit.
4.3.3 Comparative Statics and Low Tail Risk
Since a key driver of flows is the collateral gap ∆̂, which from Proposition 2 can be written
as ∆̂ = dD(γ(î1)− γ(î2)) > 0, flows are generally greater when the payoff in the down
state dD is greater, reflecting a greater collateral capacity of both assets as well as a greater
distinction between debt and down tranches. Our model implies that gross and net flows
increase as collateral capacity increases. Figure 7 plots asset prices and flow values as
a function of the downside risk dD. Both p̂ and p̂∗ are increasing in dD, and so is the
collateral gap ∆̂. Accordingly, gross flows are larger the higher is dD, as are net flows.29
5 A Dynamic Model of Global Flows
The static model in Section 4 illustrates how financial integration affects prices and cre-
ates cross-border flows. In this section we use a three-period variation of the C-model
introduced in Section 3, with bad news arriving at an interim date, to consider the effect of
financial integration on volatilities of flows and prices.
29These results are robust to varying beliefs, including allowing beliefs to be substantially convex. Since
varying the down payoff mechanically increases the expected payoff of both assets, we have also considered
the same comparative static varying dD while also varying beliefs so that the expected payoff to each agent
remains the same even as the down payoff varies. To do so, we set a base down payoff of R̄ = 0.2 and define
modified beliefs by γ̃(i;dD) =
ȳ(i)−dD
1−dD , where ȳ(i) is the expected asset payoff for person i when dD = R̄.
Correcting in this way, the results are in fact even stronger.
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Figure 7: Comparative statics and low tail risk.
Our dynamic analysis shows that financial integration amplifies price volatility of both
Home and Foreign assets, thus increasing global volatility. Moreover, capital flows dry up
after bad news.
Consistent with Observation 2 in the Introduction, our results highlight that financial
integration amplifies financial shocks and exports volatility across countries. Thus, in the
presence of other shocks (trade, import prices, productivity, etc.), financial shocks become
more significant given the higher volatility, and so financial shocks will tend to transmit
through financial integration.
5.1 Dynamic Model
The model is a three-period general equilibrium model, with time t = 0,1,2. Uncertainty
is represented by a tree S = {0,U,D,UU,DU,DD}, illustrated in Figure 8, with a root
s = 0 at time 0 and terminal states ST = {UU,DU,DD} at time 2. Denote by s∗ the unique
predecessor of state s.
Let Ls = {cs,Ys} be the set of commodities in each non-terminal state s∈{0,U,D}, and
Ls = {cs} the set of commodities in terminal states s ∈ ST . Let the inter-period production
functions be as Fs(c0,Y )= (c0,Y ), s=U,D, (i.e., consumption and the asset Y are durable)
and Fs(cs∗,Ys∗) = cs∗+dsYs∗ s ∈ ST . As in the static model, the consumption good is per-
fectly durable and the assets only pay dividends in units of the consumption good in the
terminal states. In the numerical simulation that follows we assume that dUU = dDU = 1








Figure 8: Dynamic C-model.
ized by increases in volatility after interim bad news.30
As before, we take the price of cs in state s ∈ S to be one. The price of the asset Y at
non-terminal nodes is denoted by ps.
Consider the same type of agents as in Section 3 with von-Neumann-Morgenstern
expected utility as
U i = icUU + i(1− i)cDU +(1− i)2cDD, (15)
which corresponds to agent i having belief i of receiving good news at t = 1, and having
belief i that, conditional on receiving bad news, assets will pay high dividends at t = 2
(thus, with probability (1− i)2 the economy receives bad news twice and the asset pays
the low dividend dDD = 0.2.).
Agents have endowments at all non-terminal nodes. In particular, we take (ecs,eYs) = 1
for s = 0,U,D. All assets, whether endowed at t = 0 or t = 1 pay identical dividends in
t = 2 (i.e., the endowments of assets at time 1 are of a separate vintage of assets).
30Fostel and Geanakoplos (2012a) study extensively this type of stochastic structure. They show that if
agents were given the possibility to choose to invest in projects that have associated more volatility after bad
news or more volatility after good news, they would always chose the former.
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At t = 0 and t = 1 agents can trade one-period financial contracts collateralized by
Y .31 For each j ∈ J, the contract is denoted by the pair (A j,C j) ∈ RL/L0+ ×R
L/LT
+ . For each
state s ∈ S/{0}, As j ∈ RLs+ specifies the promises that are due, backed by the collateral
Cs∗ j ∈ RLs∗+ deposited in state s∗.
Finally, budget sets and collateral equilibrium are analogous to the static model and
are presented in detail in Appendix B.
As we did in Section 4, in what follows we consider a model with two countries that
are identical in all respects except for the sets J and J∗.32 We first characterize the autarkic
equilibrium in Foreign and Home to demonstrate how leverage and tranching affect dy-
namics, and then we consider the equilibrium with financial integration. For expositional
ease, all equations for this section are provided in Appendix C.
5.2 Foreign Autarky: Leverage Cycle
At each non-terminal node, agents can trade one-period debt contracts backed by Y ∗. Since
at U all uncertainty is resolved, there is no trade; hence we only need to focus on s = 0,D.
When agents can leverage, the dynamic equilibrium is essentially different from the static
equilibrium, though the equilibrium regimes in each state resemble the equilibrium regime
in the static economy of Section 4. As before, in equilibrium the only contracts traded each
period are the maxmin contracts: j∗0 = p
∗
D at s = 0 and j
∗
D = dDD at s = D. These contracts




D = dDD respectively.
As shown in Figure 9, at s = 0 there is a marginal buyer i∗0 such that all investors with
i > i∗0 buy Y
∗ with leverage. Crucially, in state D all investors that bought the asset with
leverage lose their initial investments (the debt they owe is the value of their entire asset
holdings) and their only wealth comes from the new endowments. This means that the
31Contracts become a little more complicated with multiple periods. Multi-period contracts can destroy
the anonymity of delivery, since different sellers of the contract may disagree about whether to default at
intermediate states. To keep things simple and maintain anonymity, we restrict our attention to one-period
contracts, for which there can be no disagreement about how much to deliver (under our hypothesis of
no-recourse collateral).
32Appendix E considers extensions regarding the nature of uncertainty with partial correlation when (as a
simplification) the Foreign asset cannot be leveraged. Our analysis shows that partial correlation reinforces












Buy the bond  j=dDD
and consumption good.
i*0
Figure 9: Dynamic equilibrium regime in Foreign.
asset must be bought by more pessimistic investors i∈ [0, i∗0]. In state D there is a marginal
buyer i∗D, such that all remaining investors with i > i
∗
D buy Y
∗ with leverage by borrowing
dDD against each unit of the asset. For parameters above, the equilibrium is given by:
p∗0 = 0.957, p
∗
D = 0.722, i
∗
0 = 0.88, i
∗
D = 0.65.
The price crashes by 24.55%. The economy exhibits what Geanakoplos (2003) called
the “Leverage Cycle:” leverage is pro-cyclical and creates excess volatility above funda-
mentals. Specifically, after bad news in s = D the asset price falls for three reasons. First,
fundamentals are worse (a bad payoff is more likely). The marginal buyer i∗0 thinks the
expected payoff of Y ∗ is 98.5 at 0 and only 90 at D, a drop of 9%. Second, the equi-
librium margin increases in state D, and so investors use less leverage and the marginal
buyer is therefore less optimistic. Third, investors who used leverage in the first period
have less wealth after bad news as a result of the margin call to repay their debts. These
optimistic buyers—the most optimistic buyers—after repaying their debt have no wealth
besides their new endowments, and as a result less optimistic investors are required to buy
the asset. The change in the marginal buyer from 0.88 to 0.65, together with the change
in margins, almost triples the price drop (24%), since the change from fundamentals alone
31
accounts for 9%. Leverage creates excess volatility.33
5.3 Home Autarky: Securitization Cycle
At each non-terminal node agents can also trade one-period tranche contracts backed by
Y.
In the dynamic economy with tranching, the equilibrium regimes in each state resem-
ble the equilibrium regime in the static economy of Section 4. However, the dynamic
equilibrium is essentially different from the static equilibrium due to wealth effects and
changes in collateral values. As in the static model, without loss of generality, we can
restrict our attention to a single tranche traded each period: at s = 0 agents can trade a
tranche promising (0, pD) at t = 1, and at s = D agents can trade a tranche promising
(0,dDD) at t = 2.
In equilibrium there are two marginal buyers in each state. In s= 0, investors i> i10 buy
the risky asset and issue a down tranche promising pD at t = 1, investors with i ∈ [i20, i10]
hold all the consumption good, and investors with i < i20 buy the down tranche, which has
a price πT0 . In s = D, investors i > i
1
0 lose all their initial wealth after repaying their debt
from issuing tranches, and they use their new wealth to purchase Y . There is a marginal
buyer i1D such that the new endowments of Y are bought by the investors i > i
1
D, and
the investors i ∈ [i2D, i10] buy all the old Y . All investors buying Y issue a down tranche
promising dDD at t = 2 (note that dDD < pD and so the value of tranche issuance falls).
There is a marginal buyer i2D such that all investors i < i
2
D buy the down tranche, at a
price of πTD . The remaining moderate investors hold the consumption good. For the same
parameter values in equilibrium we get p0 = 1.131, pD = 0.844, i10 = 0.88, i
1
D = 0.65,
πT0 = 0.508, π
T
D = 0.184, i
2
0 = 0.24, i
2
D = 0.08. The asset price with tranching starts out
significantly higher (1.131 compared to 0.957 in Foreign), due to its higher collateral value
33Compared to the original Geanakoplos (2003) model, the difference between the crashes with and with-
out leverage are smaller in our example because of the interim endowments (the original model only has
endowments at t = 0.) As a result, the wealth effect following bad news is smaller in our model. See also
Fostel and Geanakoplos (2014) for an equivalent model with two agents with heterogeneous risk-aversion
and endowments. In that model, the marginal buyer is the same but the wealth of the marginal buyer de-
creases in the bad state, increasing the marginal utility of consumption and causing the investor to discount
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Figure 10: Dynamic equilibrium regime in Home.
(notice a bubble emerges, as was also the case in the static model with tranching).
The price crash is now 41%, much larger than in the leverage economy. The model with
Home tranching exhibits a “Securitization Cycle.” Because tranching greatly increases the
initial collateral value of the asset, which decreases following bad news, tranching creates
excess volatility even compared to when the asset could be used to issue debt.
5.4 Financial Integration in the Dynamic Model
With financial integration, Home and Foreign agents have access to the same set of fi-
nancial instruments in every non-terminal state. In equilibrium in period 0 there are two
marginal buyers: î10, and î
2
0, in both countries. The most optimistic investors, with i ≥ î10,
buy assets and use them as collateral to finance their purchases: they buy the Home asset
Y, selling the down tranche at price π̂T0 due at t = 1 (which pays p̂D in s = D); and buy Y
∗
selling debt due at t = 1 (promising p̂∗D ). Optimistic agents are effectively buying the Ar-
row U and U∗ securities. Moderate agents with i ∈ [î20, î10] hold the consumption goods and
risk-free debt backed by Y ∗. The most pessimistic agents, with i < î20, buy down tranches.
33
After bad news, important wealth distributions take place: the optimists holding Y
and Y ∗ have limited wealth after debt repayment/margin calls, and the pessimists holding
tranches have increased wealth. In D there are two marginal buyers, î1D, and î
2
D in both
countries. The original investors in assets use their new endowments to purchase assets,
but they have no other wealth to use after selling their initial asset holdings in order to
repay their financial obligations due at t = 1. The assets sold are purchased by new, but
less optimistic, buyers with i ∈ [î1D, î10), which are the most optimistic investors who held a
risk free position 0. The most pessimistic investors, with i < î2D, buy down tranches.
5.4.1 Financial Integration and Asset Prices
Table 2 presents asset prices and crashes both in autarky and with financial integration.
Consistent with the static analysis, financial integration affects asset prices at s = 0: the
Home price increases from 1.131 to 1.396 (a substantial bubble), the Foreign price de-
creases from 0.957 to 0.913, and the tranche price increases from 0.508 to 0.668.
Table 2: Prices and crashes with financial integration.
Time-0










Aut. Fin Int (ˆ)
Y crash 41.04 % 43.41 %
Y ∗ crash 24.55 % 25.60 %
total 65.59% 69.00%
Moreover, financial integration increases the price crashes for both Home and Foreign:
the Home price crash increases from 41.04% to 43.41%, and the Foreign crash increases
from 24.55% to 25.60%. The “Securitization Cycle” mechanisms amplifying volatility in
the Home autarkic equilibrium affect both Home and Foreign asset prices with financial
integration. First, because the Foreign asset is priced relative to the Home asset price,
the excess volatility of the Home asset transfers to the Foreign asset. Second, financial
integration also amplifies volatility at Home because financial integration has increased the
value of tranching, which increases the collateral value of the Home asset and therefore
increases the price volatility of the Home asset.34 Because the Foreign asset is priced
34Gong and Phelan (2016b) derive a similar result in a closed-economy setting by studying how equilib-
34
relative to the Home asset, the Foreign asset is much more volatile as well.Thus, even
though in the static model the Foreign asset price decreases with financial integration,
which might suggest that the economy is more stable, the Foreign price following bad
news is even lower with financial integration compared to autarky because of the additional
amplifying mechanisms absorbed through financial integration. This is because the large
price crash in the volatile Home asset also affects the price crash in the Foreign assets,
which is priced relative to the Home asset.
5.4.2 Financial Integration, Gross Flows and the Current Account
Gross and net flows decrease following bad news. Table 3 shows flows in Y , Y ∗, and
consumption goods at s = 0 and following bad news at s = D. The value of Foreign
purchases of Home assets decreases by 36.8% and the value of Home purchases of Foreign
assets decreases by 32.5%, and net flows in consumption good decrease by over 56%.
These results are consistent with intuition from the comparative statics varying the down
payoff. In the initial period, the subsequent down payoffs next period in t = 1 (prices
of 0.79 and 0.679) are not nearly as severe as the possible down payoffs in t = 2 having
received bad news at t = 1 (dDD = 0.2). Accordingly, the debt capacity of the Home asset
dramatically decreases after bad news: the tranche price decreases from 0.668 at s = 0 to
0.191 at s = D, implying investors can borrow less than one-third as much. Thus, as the
possible down payoff next period decreases from t = 0 to t = 1, flows decrease, which is
consistent with the comparative static of varying dD.
Table 3: Dynamic global flows with financial integration.
s = 0 s = D Decrease (%)
Foreign purchases of Y 0.62 0.39 36.81%
Home purchases of Y ∗ 0.51 0.34 32.52%
Home purchases of c∗ 0.11 0.05 56.27%
rium changes when debt contracts can be used as collateral to make financial promises (“debt collateraliza-
tion”). They show that debt collateralization increases the collateral value of the risky asset and increases
the volatility of asset prices.
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Figure 11: Ratio of flows following bad news and low tail risk.
5.4.3 Comparative Dynamics and Low Tail Risk
Our results are robust to varying the degree of downside risk. We provide comparative
dynamics by varying the down payoff dDD and consider the price crashes and collapse
in flows. First, the collapse in flows is greatest when downside risk is larger (lower dDD).
Figure 11 plots the ratio of flows at s=D to the value at s= 0. Flows collapse dramatically
after bad news, with greater collapse the greater the severity (lower dDD).
Second, price crashes are always bigger with financial integration regardless of the
crash risk. Figure 12 plots Home and Foreign price crashes in autarky and with financial
integration. Crashes in both countries are always larger with financial integration. Further-
more, our results continue to hold when news about the Home and Foreign assets are only
partially correlated, which would provide diversification motives for trade. Indeed, the re-
sults in Appendix E show that diversification mechanisms reinforce collateral-based mech-
anisms rather than undoing them. Collateral-driven trades continue to amplify volatility,
and the effects with partial correlation can be even larger.
6 Conclusion
We presented a two-country general equilibrium model with collateralized lending and
tranching in which global capital flows are driven by different abilities to use assets as
collateral across countries. All countries have access to the same financial instruments
after financial integration, yet price-convergence does not occur due to gap in collateral
36
 
Figure 12: Price crashes in autarky and with Financial integration. Sensitivity of price
volatility to low tail risk.
values. Financial integration provides Foreign access to attractive Home financial assets,
and cross-border flows arise in both directions as a result of general equilibrium changes
in the prices of currently available assets. These flows arise as a way for countries to
share scarce collateral and to trade contingent claims, including safe and negative beta
assets. Differences in the ability to use collateral are enough to generate global financial
flows. Moreover, Home always run a current account deficit, proportional to the positive
collateral gap.
Our results imply that collateral-driven flows increase asset price volatility globally
and lead to collapses in flows following bad news about fundamentals. Financial integra-
tion leads to portfolio rebalancing and cross-country asset purchases, especially among
investors with the highest demand for leverage. The resulting flows have important conse-
quences for financial stability, exporting volatility abroad and amplifying volatility glob-
ally. Thus, our results can explain flows among similarly-developed countries that increase
volatility rather than dampen shocks.
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